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Abstract 
 
Legal structures of divorce settlements are important in how marital division of labour 
impacts on divorce. They affect not only divorce welfare but also Coasean within-
marriage allocations. We offer a new theoretical framework to empirically identify 
Coasean and non-Coasean behaviour. Whilst an increase in the spouse’s wage always 
reduces (increases) non-Coasean labour supply (home production), observing an 
increase in both types of production indicates Coasean bargaining. Observing labour 
supply falls after a divorce will again indicate Coasean bargaining. We give a possible 
explanation for why males’ preferences for stereotypical work division and the females 
emphasise on non-monetary work aspects persist. 
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1. Introduction. 
In the economics of marriage and divorce, a simple question has been asked: Do 
married couples engage in Coasean bargains that ensure efficiency, or are marriages 
characterised by non-Coasean behaviour where inefficient divorces may ensue? This 
matter stems from the substantial empirical literature investigating the effects of the 
change in divorce laws on divorce rates, that emerges from Becker (1973, 1974) and 
Becker et al. (1977) seminal discussion where it is argued the move to unilateral 
divorces should have no impact on divorce rates as long as there is Coasean bargaining 
between the marital partners. It is a line of research that has not resulted in a strict 
consensus, for whereas some papers argue the trend in divorce rates has remained 
unchanged others have taken the contrary stand.  
Our paper will not directly seek to join either side of the divide over the impact 
of the introduction of unilateral divorce laws, but will instead contribute by opening a 
new front. An agnostic approach is adopted by investigating the Coasean and the non-
Coasean cases in turn. Thus rather than presupposing either of the two regimes we 
investigate both cases to compare and contrast the case specific labour market and 
home production outcomes. As such new insight is gained providing testable predictions 
that has the potential to shed more light on the issue.  
Whilst we find some similarities across the regimes there are also notable 
differences. So though in both cases divorce rates fall with increases in marital 
production abilities we also find major dissimilarities. Coasean married employment 
exceeds the non-Coasean equivalent employment. Under Coasean behaviour we find an 
increase in the spouse’s wage encourages own labour supply and that it is sometimes 
possible for employment to be higher in marriage than divorce. Contrast this to our non-
Coasean finding where increases in the spouse wage reduces own labour supply, and 
where non-Coasean divorced employment unambiguously exceeds married 
employment.  
Legal frameworks, with their rules that characterise property rights within and 
out of marriage, play an important role in the time allocated to labour market and 
marital production activities. This is a largely under-exploited avenue of research. Thus 
this paper will also seek to add to our understanding of how the courts’ division of 
marital income and assets in the event of a divorce interacts with a marital couple’s 
behaviour within marriage and the potential decision to seek a divorce. We demonstrate 
how different sharing regimes produce different effects. With an increasing trend 
towards more equitable sharing of income in the event of a divorce we pay special 
attention to this regime without explicitly restricting other sharing arrangements.   
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We include a discussion on some related literature in the following section. 
Section 3 then includes a discussion on some of the legal framework underlying the post 
marital divorce division of wealth and why such considerations are important here. We 
proceed to outline the main aspects of the model in Section 4. We then solve the model 
in Section 5, whereas Section 6 offers a concluding statement. 
 
2. The Paper in the Context of Related Literature. 
The literature that investigates the effect of changes in divorce law can, as 
mentioned above, be subdivided into those papers that support Coasean behaviour and 
those who do not. Though Peters (1986, 1992) argues that the introduction of unilateral 
divorce laws in the US had no effect on the overall divorce rate, Allen (1992) and 
Friedberg (1998) for instance claim the opposite. Wolfers (2006) offers the view that 
the effect is only transitory. González and Viitanen (2009) conduct a European cross 
country study that reports significant effects of changes in divorce laws on divorce rates.  
From theory it follows that marriages are governed by efficient Coasean 
bargains when marriage transactions are costless and without frictions. Non-Coasean 
behaviour and inefficient separations, on the other hand, can only occur when these 
frictionless conditions are violated.1 Some papers in the non-Coasean tradition do not 
explicitly model the frictions. Such papers include Rasul (2005) who, by simply 
assuming the absence of Coasean bargains, argues that the change to unilateral divorce 
laws can cause those married to be better matched than those previously married under 
mutual consent divorce laws, and Matouschek and Rasul (2008) who  argue marriage 
contracts are most typically drawn up for commitment reasons. Papers that explicitly 
model the process include Peters (1986), who argues that the frictionless assumptions 
of Coasean bargaining are violated when the individual shocks are privately observed. 
They also include Rainer (2007) who provides a contracting reason as well as Geddes 
and Lueck (2002) who argue the violation of Coase happens through the generation of 
transaction costs arising from hold-up associated with human capital investment.  
One strand of ensuing literature from the seminal work of Becker, whose focus 
includes the division of labour and human capital acquisition and where gender 
differences arise for comparative advantage reasons, examines the incentives to partake 
                                                 
1Though inefficiencies arise from the lack of Coasean trade within the marriage, sub-optimal outcomes can 
arise for at least two other reasons, pertaining to hold up and the externalities of getting married/divorced 
have on individuals other than the married couple. The first of these types of inefficiencies yields under-
investments to the joint detriment of the couple later on, whereas the second type concerns either 
externalities affecting other family members  or trading externalities imposed on the mating market should 
a couple decide to marry or divorce.  
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in investment within the marriage. This strand can for our purposes broadly be 
subdivided into two. On the one hand are the papers who do not consider divorce at all. 
Lundberg and Pollack (1993), for instance, present a convincing argument that the valid 
threat point in the marital bargain is not contained in divorce, but is instead found in the 
non-cooperative outcome within the marriage. Thus the outside option of divorce is of 
little interest in their model. On the other hand are the papers allowing divorces that 
arise when a common unavoidable exogenous shock to the marriage is sufficiently 
severe, but where it is critically assumed that no action is undertaken to soften the blow. 
This therefore implies that the divorce rates are characterised solely by the size of the 
exogenous shock. Such exogeneity issues arise for instance in Rainer (2007), who 
investigates the incentives of prenuptial agreements and includes a discussion of how 
the outcome is affected by different levels of divorce, but not how the choices made 
affect divorce rates. Another example is Lommerud (1989) who discusses how the risk 
of divorce may affect the division of labour within the marriage, but not vice versa. This 
paper will not investigate investments and differs further from this literature in another 
important respect: The Coasean part of our model also investigates the individuals’ 
evading actions that may affect divorce rates. Thus the focus in the Coasean analysis is 
wider than the above literature where divorce rates are purely exogenous.  
In addition, to our paper’s comparative analysis of Coasean and non-Coasean 
behaviour, it distinguishes itself from the existing literature in at least two further 
respects. First it differs in its treatment of private and public goods. Most of the 
literature assumes that some goods are private, usually those derived in the labour 
market, whereas others are public, usually those derived in home/marriage production. 
We instead follow the assumption of Peters and Siow (2002) that goods whether 
produced at home or in the market are public,2 though we also assume that leisure is 
private. Second, our paper is unique and novel in its division of time. We know of no 
other paper on marriage and divorce that splits time between market work, marriage 
work and leisure. In contrast to our approach, the literature invariably assumes that 
time spent in home/marriage production and leisure is one and the same. Not only is 
this a gross simplification, it is also a feature that may force a perfectly negative 
correlated co-movement between market work and home production. For, if time can 
only be spent by supplying labour to market or home production, it follows that time in 
marriage production must inevitable fall when there is a rise in the time spent in the 
labour market. Thus the tri-partition of time introduced in this paper is more than a 
trivial extension of the model, as it provides the means to which a positive correlation 
                                                 
2 For a further discussion on public goods within families see Bergstrom (1997).  
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between production in the home and market sector is not automatically excluded. It is 
therefore quite possible not always to arrive at the conclusion, common in the 
comparative advantage literature, that marital survival is helped by a division of labour 
that specifies specialisation. Nor is a more equal division of labour where females have a 
great degree of financial independence necessarily detrimental to marital success. 
Without yielding definite answers, the paper sheds further light on the question of 
whether it is better for spouses to separate their tasks, so that one stays at home and the 
other works in the labour marked, or whether the couple could improve their prospects 
by sharing the responsibility of home and market production more equally. 
Finally, this paper is also linked to Browning and Chiappori (1998), and 
Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002), who have developed a “collective” framework for 
intrahousehold bilateral decision processes, that encompasses a range of collective 
bargaining and contracting models. Whereas the non-Coasean part of the model is less 
cooperative than that literature, the analysis offered in this paper can be viewed as more 
cooperative than the (non-cooperative) models of Chen and Wolley (2001), Konrad and 
Lommerud (2000), Lundberg and Pollak (1993, 1994), Vagstad (2001), who typically 
assume that some goods are private goods.3 Instead our paper assumes that all goods 
(apart from leisure) are public to the extent that they are shared equally amongst the 
spouses.  
 
3. The Division of Income and Legal Rules.  
 Since property rights within marriage and divorce depend on the legal 
framework we include a brief discussion of some judicial traditions and recent 
prevailing trends in this section. 
 If si (s-i) denotes the share of aggregate wealth an individual (her/his spouse) 
receives after a divorce, then an equitable division rule would imply; si=s-i=½. Whilst 
this may seem a restrictive case it may in many instances be close to reality. Indeed in 
many judicial districts this legal practice is well established. Such legal jurisdictions 
include those that are governed by “Community of acquests” laws present in the US 
community property states,4 and European legislative authorities such as Scotland,5 see 
                                                 
3 Early work in that tradition includes Manser and Brown (1980), McElroy and Horney (1981). 
4 The community property states in the US include Arizona, California, Idaho, New Mexico, Louisiana, 
Washington, Nevada, Texas, Wisconsin, and Alaska, where property acquired by either spouse while 
married automatically becomes joint property. All other US states other than the “Community of acquest” 
states (apart from Mississippi) are “equitable distribution states” and could at a push said to be close to the 
assumption of s=½ in that division in these states should at the least be fair, if not necessarily equal. 
5 Note that law varies across the UK and therefore that Scotland’s legal system differs from that in England 
and Wales.  
 
 
5 
Smith (2000),6 where property accumulation during marriage is divided equally. 
Furthermore, it is equally germane in countries with “Universal Community” laws such 
as the Scandinavian countries where all property is assumed to be available for equal 
division. We also argue, with the support of Smith (2007), that limiting the study to this 
rule, si=s-i=½, is becoming less restrictive with time as such an application of family law 
is becoming increasingly widespread with changing social norms.  
Common law countries with “Judicial discretion,” such as England, for instance, 
who traditionally awarded financial assistance fairly on account of future needs of 
spouses have seen recent moves toward equality in the division of marital surplus, see 
the House of Lord (2000) judgment. This ruling, which concerns the case White vs. 
White, made legal precedence for divorcing couples, deeming the contributions of the 
breadwinner and home maker equally valid and effectively deciding that equal sharing 
should become the default position: It states: “As a general guide, equality should be 
departed from only if, and to the extent that, there is good reason for doing so.”7 This 
was followed by a series of high profile cases in England, suggesting the preceding court 
ruling has had a marked effect. These include Morgan vs. Morgan, 2000 where the ex-
wife became a member of the Sunday Times Rich List when she won a settlement of 
£100m after the couple divorced. In Miller vs. Miller, 2006 Alan, former husband of 
Melissa, unsuccessfully appealed against a £5m divorce settlement, saying his wife of 
three years had been given a "meal ticket for life“. In Mcfarlane vs. Mcfarlane, 2006 Julia, 
was awarded £250,000 a year and half of her ex-husband's £3m estate.  
All these cases and several more indicate a move to more equitable sharing rules 
within divorce. How many more couples may practice equal sharing irrespective of legal 
structure is likely to be a reflection of social norms and is ultimately a matter for 
empirical verification. Though we do not restrict our model solely to the case of 
equitable sharing, we note equity of partners within and out of marriage seems ever 
more realistic and we will therefore in the following afford it special attention. 
It is, despite the previous paragraphs, important to note that it may not be the 
share of wealth the parties receive within wedlock and in divorce that by itself is 
important, but rather how the share changes should the parties make the transition 
from marriage to divorce. In other words, our model, that has chosen a benchmark of 
                                                 
6 For an economic model which links divorce and legal structure see Clark (1999) 
7 It should be noted that the legal matters in England surrounding the principle of equal sharing are 
considerably more complicated than a blanket equal sharing of marital assets and income. Indeed it is 
possible for the courts to award, on the grounds of several factors, the lower earning party in a divorce 
settlement less and also more than their equal share of property. These factors include wealth and age at the 
time of marriage, the accumulation during marriage, the length of marriage and needs based considerations. 
Nevertheless the principle of equal sharing following White vs. White prevails as the predominant principle. 
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equal within a marriage, could without loss of generality be extended to situations 
where the married spouses are attributed different shares when married. The driver of 
the results in that augmented model would then be whether or not the spouses receive 
the same share when divorced. It can therefore be argued that the special case in the 
model below of an equitable divorce division, si=s-i=½, can effortlessly be extended to 
situations and legal regimes where the couple are given the same proportion of funds in 
divorce as in marriage, as seems to be the basis of more ‘traditional’ needs based 
divisions, such as in equitable distribution states.    
 
4. The model. 
We present a one period model of marriage where two married individuals i and 
-i consider the pros and cons of staying in wedlock. We assume that marriages have 
previously been entered into voluntarily so that the ex ante expected value of marriage, 
i
mEV , exceeds the value of a divorce 
i
dV . However at the beginning of the period each 
individual receives marriage specific information, through the experience of a marriage 
specific independently distributed random idiosyncratic shock i with an expected 
value of zero and an upper and a lower bound of LH   and . Individual i’s ex post value 
of marriage, imV , is therefore 
ii
m
i
m EVV   and no longer guaranteed to exceed the 
value of a divorce. Thus when the shock has been revealed the individuals either 
separately or together consider whether they should continue the marriage or go down 
the divorce route.  If the shocks are favourable the marriage survives, whereas if the 
shocks are bad enough they will result in a split, immediately triggering a divorce. The 
individual shock, whether good or bad, has a lasting effect on the individual if the couple 
remains married but is not felt if divorced. We assume individuals optimise either 
separately (non-Coasean) or jointly (Coasean) to maximise the value of marriage, 
whereas they individually maximise their individual values of divorce.  Thus they trade 
off the (maximum) value of the marriage against the (maximum) value of a divorce.   
A married individual divides her/his time between 1) time 
i
ml  spent in the 
labour market, 2) marital time im that might either be spent on physical marriage 
specific goods and services production or on intangibles such as attention and love,8 and 
                                                 
8 This is in the spirit of Parkman (2004), who discusses marital gifts that benefit a spouse. Such gifts may be 
physical in nature, manifested for instance through physical presents but also of a more psychological kind 
and include attention given, empathy, affection and communication in time spent together. Parkman shows 
that such gift exchanges are important factors that ensure a successful marriage and that divorcees report 
lower levels of such gift exchanges in their failed marriages than do those who continue to be married.  
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3) leisure time imr , which is the only pure private good in this model. Total time is 
normalised to unity so that; iml + 
im + imr =1. An additional hour spent in labour returns 
the wage rate, ,iw  implying a take-home pay of: 
i
m
ilw . The value of an additional hour of 
marriage specific production is reflected by the parameter iA , which is a technological 
production factor that enhances marital production iimA .9  
  Goods, whether produced in the market or at home, are common, public and 
divided equally amongst the spouses. Thus the individual specific monetary values 
within marriage derived from the labour market and marital specific production are 
given by   
2
i
m
ii
m
i lwlw 
and 
2
iiii mAmA 
 respectively. The spouses share identical, 
strictly concave utility functions, separable across market production, marital specific 
production and leisure, where the utility derived from market goods is u, the utility from 
marital specific production goods is  and the utility from leisure is . To reflect the 
disutility of work and marital production, the spouses each face costs associated with 
the two productive activities which are solely a function of their own time spent in that 
activity. We impose strict convexity of the cost functions )(
i
m
i
l lc  and )(
ii
m mc for market 
and marriage specific production respectively. 
It follows that the net value, 𝑉𝑚
𝑖   within the marriage can be characterised by: 
iii
m
i
m
i
l
ii
m
iiiii
m
ii
m
i
i
m mclcml
mAmAlwlw
uV  




 





 


)()()1(
22
          (1) 
In order to pin down the survival/divorce probabilities further, we need to 
consider each individual’s outside divorce opportunity, i
dV . No marriage specific 
production takes place after a divorce and the benefits from being productive in 
marriage are forever zero in the event of a marital breakdown.10 The same is not the 
case for labour market production. Marital production stems in other words from 
(marriage) specific human capital, whereas an individual’s labour market income is 
derived from general (between marital states) human capital, which is perfectly 
transferable from marriage to divorce.  
                                                 
9 Though A1 and w1 are exogenous to the model and taken to reflect innate ability in performing the 
respective tasks, they may nevertheless be affected by pre-marriage investments; that is past human capital 
investments in both markets, accumulated through 1) the educational system, 2) past labour market 
experience and 3) past household/relationship activities. 
10 We are therefore for example excluding the analysis of the impact of children, from whom in practice the 
divorcee of course may derive utility well beyond marriage. 
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In the event of a divorce, a court sets the exogenously determined share, si of the 
aggregate labour income a single individual receives, whilst the spouse’s share is s-i=1-si. 
With labour market income depending on how much is worked, we assume the courts 
can deduce the expected marital labour supply of both parties and therefore the 
expected income generated had the relationship lasted. In this way all assets and income 
streams can be valued and verified perfectly. Though this is a simplification, it can 
nevertheless be noted that divorce proceedings are often associated with significant 
court resources spent on the verification of the size of the assets held by the respective 
parties in a divorce.11 We allow the divorcees’ work to vary across marital states, so that 
individual i’s married and divorced labour supply are not necessarily the same. Finally, 
though the divorced individuals lose the consumption of the marriage specific good, 
they will in exchange gain some outside additional value iH  of being single. Thus the 
value, i
dV , of the outside opportunity is given by: 
  iidilidimidiimiimiiid H)l(c)l()ll(w)lwlw(suV   1   (2) 
The net value to a divorcee consists therefore of the utility of consumption and 
leisure less the cost of labour market work and plus the additional value of the outside 
option. Note labour market income (consumption) is now comprised of two main 
elements; )()( im
i
d
ii
m
ii
m
ii llwlwlws   , the share of joint income allocated to the 
divorcee and the change in income resulting from a change in labour supply after 
marriage. The latter part; )( im
i
d
i llw     is equal to zero in the case where labour supply 
does not depend on marital status, is positive if labour supply increases after divorce 
and is negative if the opposite is true.  
 
5. Coasean bargains versus non-Coasean decisions. 
 If bargaining is costless the Coase (1960) theorem applies, as noted by Becker et 
al. (1977) and Becker (1991). Divorces are efficient under such circumstances, in the 
sense that they will never occur as long as the couple’s joint surplus is greater within as 
opposed to outside marriage. Should the joint surplus satisfy such a criterion, then “side 
payments” can be used to allow them to “work it out”. In the context of our model, for 
the case when 
i
d
i
m VV  , but where 
i
d
i
d
i
m
i
m VVVV
   there now exist a transfer, T, 
from individual –i, to the spouse i such that: id
i
m VTV   and ,
i
d
i
m VTV
   ensuring 
                                                 
11 In some cases this is fairly straightforward whereas in others such as for example the case of McFarland v 
McFarland  (see the House of Lord(2006) ruling) the determination of assets were far from straightforward, 
as reflected by the initial judge’s ruling that in relation to the assets stated that the “present value was 
inestimable and their future value unfathomable”. 
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marital survival, as it leaves neither worse off and may render one or both better off as 
compared to a divorce.   
Coasean transfers are not modelled as ‘strict’ monetary exchanges. Instead they 
take the form of changes in the time spent in the labour market and marriage specific 
production. With leisure being a private good, it can be foregone to effectively facilitate a 
transfer from the individual to her/his spouse, who may consume more market and/or 
marital goods. Thus an individual with a discontented spouse could seek to placate the 
partner with higher exertions in the marriage either by working more to increase labour 
income or by increasing efforts at home to enhance marriage specific production.  
  In contrast, in the absence of Coasean bargains and transfers  
i
d
i
m VV   will 
always invoke a unilaterally initiated divorce. Divorces will in that case occur even when 
it is not efficient, that is even when 
i
d
i
d
i
m
i
m VVVV
  .  
Consider first the absence of Coasean bargains. Here the individuals will seek a 
unilateral divorce as long as id
i
m VV  implying a person specific critical shock, ,*
i  (such 
that id
i
m VV   implying 
i
m
i
d
i EVV * ) for each individual, such that any realisation of a 
shock smaller than this triggers a divorce.  The critical shock is therefore governed by: 
 











 













 




)(
2
 )1(        
)1(        
))()((
2
)()(*
ii
m
iiii
ii
m
i
d
i
i
m
i
l
i
d
i
l
i
m
ii
m
i
i
m
i
d
ii
m
ii
m
iii
mc
mAmA
- ml
lH
lclc
lwlw
ullwlwlwsu



 (3)
 
Further understanding of expression (3) can be gained by considering a specific 
case. Assume working time is independent of marital status, as occurs when jobs are 
associated with fixed hours that cannot be altered. Assume in addition an equal post-
divorce split of labour income, so that si= ½, leading the  expression within the bracket 
of the first line of the right hand side of expression (3) to cancel out. If non-labour 
derived net benefits within marriage, as represented by the third line exceeds the non-
labour benefits outside marriage, represented by the second line, it follows that the 
shock will have to be negative for the individual to desire a marital exit. Such an 
individual will on average want the marriage to survive. 
It can be noted that the critical shock will typically differ between the two 
individuals in a married couple, even with identical utility and cost functions, since the 
natural abilities, as reflected by 
iw  and ,
iA  and the preference, Hi, for the outside 
option will in general vary between partners. Because in addition the shocks are 
idiosyncratic, it is therefore quite possible for inefficient divorces to occur.  
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It follows from (3) that a smaller shock is required to dissolve the marriage with 
a higher outside option, Hi. We will abstract away from two issues in this respect. First, 
the choice of how to allocate time between work and home may impact on the 
probability of meeting an alternative mate. This is not consider here, but is studied by 
McKinnish (2007) where those who work with a larger fraction of co-workers of the 
opposite sex are more likely to divorce in the future. Second, and yet again beyond this 
paper is the possibility that individuals may seek to improve their outside option when 
divorce becomes more likely, as is studied by Johnston and Skinner (1986) who find the 
anticipation of future divorce is coupled with greater female labour force participation. 
With a similar expression as (3) for the spouse, the overall probability of a 
divorce/marital survival in the non-Coasean case is represented in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 here 
Here the incidence of marital survival is given by the top right rectangular area. 
With symmetric agents the marital survival probability is given by 1-p=
(𝜑𝐻−𝜑∗
𝑖 )(𝜑𝐻−𝜑∗
−𝑖)
(𝜑𝐻−𝜑𝐿)2
 . 
Thus the divorce probability is p=1-
(𝜑𝐻−𝜑∗
𝑖 )(𝜑𝐻−𝜑∗
−𝑖)
(𝜑𝐻−𝜑𝐿)2
. It follows that the probability of 
divorce is rising with the critical shock, since 
𝑑𝑝
𝑑𝜑∗
𝑖 =
(𝜑𝐿−𝜑∗
−𝑖)
(𝜑𝐻−𝜑𝐿)2
>0. Any variable that 
reduces the critical shock will therefore have a positive effect on marital survival. 
Now consider the Coasean bargain case where all divorces are efficient, that is 
.id
i
d
i
m
i
m VVVV
  Here the critical joint shock is given by ,* **
ii   that is the sum 
of shocks below which divorces are unavoidable and above which marriages should to 
the joint benefit of the couple survive. This joint critical shock is simply determined by, 
i
d
i
d
i
m
i
m VVVV
  , that is ,**
i
d
i
d
iii
m
i
m VVEVEV
   implying, whilst omitting to 
substitute in  expressions (1) and (2): 
 im
i
m
i
d
i
d
ii EVEVVV   ***  .          (4) 
This is presented diagrammatically in Figure 2. The downward sloping line 
represents the combination of ex post shocks such that the individual shocks sum up to 
the critical one. The shaded area represents the incidence of efficient divorces which 
occur when the realisation of shocks are too adverse for the marriage to remain viable.  
Figure 2 here. 
Given the joint critical shock, the probability, p, of divorce follows by a simple 
geometric consideration of figure 2 so that p= 
1
2
(𝜑∗−𝜑𝐿)2
(𝜑𝐻−𝜑𝐿)2
. Note that an increased 
intolerance of bad ex post realisations, that is an increase in the critical shock, will in 
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effect increase the probability of a divorce since  
𝑑𝑝
𝑑𝜑∗
=
(𝜑∗−𝜑𝐿)
(𝜑𝐻−𝜑𝐿)2
>0. As expected, a simple 
comparison of Figures 1 and 2 illustrates that divorces occur more often in the absence 
of Coasean bargains and transfers.  
 Not wanting to restrict our analysis to either of the two cases depicted in Figure 
1 and 2, we will instead analyse the cases in turn starting with the non-Coasean case and 
for then to proceed to the Coasean case next. This will enable us to compare and 
contrast the two frameworks. The following proposition demonstrates that though there 
are undoubtedly some differences, one must not overegg the argument for there are also 
a lot of similarities. We note that any factors that ceteris paribus decrease (increase) the 
individual’s critical shock  
i
*  in the non-Coasean case will also ceteris paribus decrease 
(increase) the critical shock 
*  in the Coasean case. 
Proposition 1.  
The critical shocks 
i
* , in the non-Coasean, and 
* , in the Coasean case, and therefore 
also the respective divorce rates, are declining with both own and spouse’s innate ability 
in producing marriage specific products.  
The proof is in the Appendix. 
Proposition 1 shows the effect of a higher ability in marriage specific production 
is to increase marital survival rates in both the non-Coasean and the Coasean case. This 
implies that high marriage specific production ability, high innate love couples are less 
likely to seek a divorce. Marital ability has both a direct effect; that makes the individual 
less likely to seek a divorce, and an indirect externality effect; reducing the spouse’s 
divorce propensity. It should be noted, with ability being exogenously given, that 
investment in marital production has not been modelled in our study that concentrates 
on the ex post separation decision. Several previous studies suggest nevertheless an 
under-investment in marriage specific capital, see for instance Baker and Jacobsen 
(2007) and Vagstad (2001). This would in the light of Proposition 1 translate into higher 
divorce rates.  
  The non-Coasean individual spouse’s choice of time spent in the labour market 
and marriage production in a continuing marriage is given by:12 
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12 The leisure choice follows trivially from conditions (5a), (5b) and the time constraint. 
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These two first order conditions then reduce to: 
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The private optimum requires, according to expression (6), the individual to 
equate private net marginal benefits, derived from labour market activity, with those 
derived from marriage specific production. Note that this private optimum does not 
necessarily maximise the joint marital surplus, which in the absence of any trading 
externalities we deem to be equivalent to the social surplus. Indeed in order to 
investigate whether the privately optimal coincides with the jointly (social) efficient, we 
will seek to maximise the social value of marriage survival, SV, which is merely given by 
the sum of the individual spouses’ values of marriage, that is SV=
i
m
i
m VV
 . By recalling 
that spouses have identical utility functions, the conditions relating to individual i’s 
socially optimal choices of market and marriage specific production follow: 
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Which implies:   
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Thus expression (8) states that the social optimum occurs where the social net 
marginal benefit in labour market production is equated to the social net marginal 
benefit in marriage specific production. From expressions (5a), (5b), (7a) and (7b) we 
can directly note that the private levels of effort in both sectors, as reflected by iml  
and 
im , when the marriage survives are lower than the socially optimal levels. This is the 
standard fee riding under-provision result that arises in the public goods literature. In 
this case each partner in the marriage fails to take into account the positive externality 
their production has on their partner’s utility. It reflects a tendency in marriages to work 
too little both in the market and at home. Though it is well known from the marriage 
literature that joint increases in contributions to the public good yield Pareto 
improvements, see Konrad and Lommerud (2000), our model illustrates that this may 
also apply simultaneously to labour market and marital production contributions. 
Proposition 2.  
An increase in the spouse’s wage will reduce (increase) one’s own labour supply 
(home production) in the non-Coasean case. 
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The proof is in the Appendix. 
Proposition 2 suggests quite intuitively that a married individual will substitute 
away from labour supply and into marital production when the wage of the spouse 
increases in the non-Coasean case. This provides a useful contrast to the spouse’s wage 
effect in the Coasean case that will later be deduced from Proposition 4 below.  
 We now turn to the Coasean case, where the parties bargain over employment 
and marital production. With i and (1- i) representing the relative bargaining strengths 
of individual i and individual –i respectively,  the Coasean Nash bargain is given by: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑙𝑚𝑖 , 𝑚𝑖,𝑙𝑚−𝑖, 𝑚−𝑖      𝐵 = (𝑉𝑚
𝑖 −𝑉𝑑
𝑖)
𝛾𝑖(𝑉𝑚
−𝑖−𝑉𝑑
−𝑖)
(1−𝛾𝑖)    (9) 
The Nash bargain outcome is now characterised by the first order conditions: 
𝜕𝐵
𝜕𝑙𝑚
𝑖 = 𝛾𝑖(𝑉𝑚
𝑖 −𝑉𝑑
𝑖)
𝛾𝑖−1
(𝑉𝑚
−𝑖−𝑉𝑑
−𝑖)
1−𝛾𝑖(
𝜕𝑉𝑚
𝑖
𝜕𝑙𝑚
𝑖 ) + (1 − 𝛾𝑖)(𝑉𝑚
𝑖 −𝑉𝑑
𝑖)
𝛾𝑖
(𝑉𝑚
−𝑖−𝑉𝑑
−𝑖)
−𝛾𝑖(
𝜕𝑉𝑚
−𝑖
𝜕𝑙𝑚
𝑖 )=0             
            (10a) 
𝜕𝐵
𝜕𝑚𝑖
= 𝛾𝑖(𝑉𝑚
𝑖 −𝑉𝑑
𝑖)
𝛾𝑖−1(𝑉𝑚
−𝑖−𝑉𝑑
−𝑖)
(1−𝛾𝑖) 𝜕𝑉𝑚
𝑖
𝜕𝑚𝑖
+ (1 − 𝛾𝑖)(𝑉𝑚
𝑖 −𝑉𝑑
𝑖)
𝛾𝑖(𝑉𝑚
−𝑖−𝑉𝑑
−𝑖)
−𝛾𝑖 𝜕𝑉𝑚
−𝑖
𝜕𝑚𝑖
=0 
            (10b) 
𝜕𝐵
𝜕𝑙𝑚
−𝑖 = 𝛾𝑖(𝑉𝑚
𝑖 −𝑉𝑑
𝑖)
𝛾𝑖−1
(𝑉𝑚
−𝑖−𝑉𝑑
−𝑖)
1−𝛾𝑖(
𝜕𝑉𝑚
𝑖
𝜕𝑙𝑚
−𝑖) + (1 − 𝛾𝑖)(𝑉𝑚
𝑖 −𝑉𝑑
𝑖)
𝛾𝑖
(𝑉𝑚
−𝑖−𝑉𝑑
−𝑖)
−𝛾𝑖(
𝜕𝑉𝑚
−𝑖
𝜕𝑙𝑚
−𝑖 )=0             
            (10c) 
𝜕𝐵
𝜕𝑚−𝑖
= 𝛾𝑖(𝑉𝑚
𝑖 −𝑉𝑑
𝑖)
𝛾𝑖−1(𝑉𝑚
−𝑖−𝑉𝑑
−𝑖)
(1−𝛾𝑖) 𝜕𝑉𝑚
𝑖
𝜕𝑚−𝑖
+ (1 − 𝛾𝑖)(𝑉𝑚
𝑖 −𝑉𝑑
𝑖)
𝛾𝑖(𝑉𝑚
−𝑖−𝑉𝑑
−𝑖)
−𝛾𝑖 𝜕𝑉𝑚
−𝑖
𝜕𝑚−𝑖
=0 
            (10d) 
Thus the proposition below follows. 
Proposition 3.  
a) Married employment in the Coasean case exceeds married employment in the 
non-Coasean case. 
b) Marriage production in the Coasean case exceeds marriage production in the 
non-Coasean case. 
Proof is in the Appendix. 
 This result is perhaps not that surprising as the Coasean bargain can attain the 
socially optimum, whereas the non-Coasean outcome cannot. Thus our previous 
discussion, following expressions (5a), (5b), (7a) and (7b), with regard to the under-
provision and free riding issues pertains to the non-Coasean case only. In the Coasean 
case in contrast agents put in more effort on average in order to make it work. The 
Coasean bargain implies some give and take so that each individual increases her/his 
effort, relatively to the purely selfish outcome, making the marriage more resilient. One 
way the Coasean bargain avoids the breakup of viable marriages is for individuals to 
work harder in the labour market. Another is to work harder within marriage 
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production. This indicates that there are more routes to marital bliss than the theory of 
comparative advantage usually suggests. Indeed the paper illustrates that giving and 
receiving in a marriage takes several forms where contributions to and benefits from the 
marriage manifests themselves both through the level of labour market income and the 
production of marriage specific goods. This does not have to involve the specialisation 
that comparative advantage models are so often associated with. Indeed we postulate, 
with differences in labour and marital productivity across marriages, that the degree of 
specialisation will vary across marriages. Thus in some marriages more equal division of 
marital tasks and labour market are used to sustain successful unions, whereas in others 
more traditional division of labour patterns are possible to make the marriage work.  
Using (10a) and (10c), then (10b) and (10d) respectively yields:   
𝛾𝑖(𝑉𝑚
−𝑖−𝑉𝑑
−𝑖) (
𝜕𝑉𝑚
𝑖
𝜕𝑙𝑚
𝑖 −
𝜕𝑉𝑚
𝑖
𝜕𝑙𝑚
−𝑖) = (1 − 𝛾𝑖) (𝑉𝑚
𝑖 −𝑉𝑑
𝑖) (
𝜕𝑉𝑚
−𝑖
𝜕𝑙𝑚
−𝑖 −
𝜕𝑉𝑚
−𝑖
𝜕𝑙𝑚
𝑖 )    (11a) 
𝛾𝑖(𝑉𝑚
−𝑖−𝑉𝑑
−𝑖) (
𝜕𝑉𝑚
𝑖
𝜕𝑚𝑖
−
𝜕𝑉𝑚
𝑖
𝜕𝑚−𝑖
) = (1 − 𝛾𝑖) (𝑉𝑚
𝑖 −𝑉𝑑
𝑖) (
𝜕𝑉𝑚
−𝑖
𝜕𝑚−𝑖
−
𝜕𝑉𝑚
−𝑖
𝜕𝑚𝑖
)    (11b) 
Proposition 4.  
Symmetry and ceteris paribus yields, in the Coasean case: 
i) With φi> φ-i it follows that 𝑙𝑚
𝑖 > 𝑙𝑚
−𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 that  𝑚𝑖 > 𝑚−𝑖. 
ii) With si <s-i it follows that 𝑙𝑚
𝑖 > 𝑙𝑚
−𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 that 𝑚𝑖 > 𝑚−𝑖. 
iii) With iw > iw it follows that 𝑙𝑚
𝑖 < 𝑙𝑚
−𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 that  𝑚𝑖 < 𝑚−𝑖 when si>½.   
iv) With iw > iw it follows that 𝑙𝑚
𝑖 ≤ 𝑙𝑚
−𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 that  𝑚𝑖 ≤ 𝑚−𝑖 when si=½ and 
𝑙𝑚
𝑖 ≤ 𝑙𝑑
𝑖  and 𝑙𝑚
𝑖 ≤ 𝑙𝑑
−𝑖
 
The proof is in the appendix. 
In the Coasean case it follows from part i) that if individual i is faced with a more 
favourable ex post realisation of marriage than individual –i, that individual i will 
increase efforts both at home as well as in the labour market. This result seems intuitive 
since an increase in an individual’s value of marriage will induce her/him to strive to 
ensure the marriage has the best possibilities of surviving. A reduction in the value of 
marriage can likewise be used as bargaining leverage by a negatively affected individual, 
given the now more credible threat to leave, eliciting a higher effort from that 
individual’s partner, who works harder in the market and at home in order to save the 
marriage. In other words, as long as it is in the joint benefit of the spouses to stay 
married, Coasean bargaining implies an arrangement can be found so that the partner 
who gains the most sacrifices the most in order for the marriage to survive. 
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 Part ii) is equally straightforward to interpret as an increase in the divorce 
settlement share of the couple’s joint labour income increases the outside option of the 
individual.  This creates a leverage that can be exploited in the bargain.  
Part iii) suggests that the individual with the largest wage will if he/she also 
receives the lion share in the divorce settlement labour market put less effort into 
labour market and marriage productive activities. Since we know from part ii) that a 
higher share in the ex post division of household income increases the individual 
bargaining position and a higher own wage will do the same, part iii) of the proposition 
follows. The person with the lowest wage and the lowest ex post share, on the other 
hand, is doubly unlucky when the divorce occurs, yielding a weak bargaining situation 
forcing her/him to exert higher effort within the marriage. Thus inequitable divorce 
shares do not only affect the individuals should a divorce occur, it also affects the 
individuals within the marriage.  
Part iv) suggest a similar effect to part iii) is obtained with equal shares ex post if 
the divorced labour supply exceeds marital labour supply. A wage increase in such a 
situation would benefit the individual more in divorce than whilst married. Thus an 
increase in labour market productivity strengthens the bargaining position of the 
individual causing the negative correlation between labour supply and wages. Similarly 
a wage increase will cause the spouse to work more, in sharp contrast to the non-
Coasean case where a spouse’s wage increase would be accompanied by a reduction in 
labour supply. This therefore provides a testable hypothesis to distinguish Coasean 
bargains from hedonistic non-cooperative behaviour. 
Whereas the actual working time is jointly determined with time allocated to 
marriage specific production whilst married, the divorcee is freed from this latter 
activity when single so that the allocation of labour (and therefore implicitly leisure) is 
simply characterised by: 0


i
m
d
i
l
V . Comparing pre and post-divorce labour market 
outcomes yields unambiguous results in the non-Coasean case: 
Proposition 5.   
If si ½  then i
m
i
d ll   in the Non-Coasean case.                             
The proofs are in the Appendix.  
That spouses, who receive the lowest share (or equal share) of the ex post 
divorce income, work more if divorced than if married is in the non-Coasean case caused 
by two effects. First, the marginal utility of market production has increased (or stayed 
constant if si= ½) as the divorcee gets less (or the same) of the joint income when 
divorced than when married. Thus the divorcee tends to work more (or not change 
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her/his working time). Second, as divorces are associated with the complete fall off in 
joint marital production, it follows that the time an individual spends on her/his own 
will increase after a divorce. This causes the marginal utility of leisure to fall, which in 
turn tends to suggest that the divorcee substitutes away from leisure into market 
productive activities. The net effect of both these two effects is therefore to work more 
when si ½.  
That we cannot generalise Proposition 5 to the case when si>½ is due to the 
reversal in the sign of the first of the effects mentioned above. In other words, for 
individuals who receive a share si>½, the marginal utility of consumption of market 
goods falls, when moving to the divorced state. This yields a negative impact on labour 
supply. However, becoming divorced will increase the marginal utility of leisure 
regardless of si and will therefore tend to increase the amount of labour supplied. 
Whether the overall impact of divorce on labour supply is positive or negative, when 
si>½, depends on which of the two opposing forces that dominate. Thus it is a matter 
that is impossible to ex ante predict without further restriction and which can otherwise 
only be concluded by empirical investigations. 
 Comparing propositions 5 and 3 yields some interesting conclusions and 
illustrates that the result of Proposition 5, valid in the non-Coasean case, does not 
necessarily translate to the Coasean case. Recall that Proposition 3 states that a Coasean 
bargain tends to yield higher labour market activity whilst married than its non-Coasean 
counterpart. It is therefore possible that the Coasean bargaining could induce higher 
labour supply within a marriage than in a divorce. Thus, while the move into a divorce 
state will free up more ‘pure’ leisure time, inducing a substitution effect into labour, the 
Coasean transfers provide a reason for the spouse to stay within the marriage to 
countervail this substitution effect. Hence, there is a possibility that Coasean trading 
partners, who are induced to work hard in order to keep their marriage from collapsing, 
would with a termination of their marriage work less. This realisation provides yet 
another way to examine whether or not marriages are subject to Coasean bargains or 
not. A finding that spouses work less after a marriage under equitable sharing rules 
would in the context of this model suggest that marriages are governed by Coasean 
bargains, whereas the opposite finding would exclude neither of the two cases. 
 We have so far not investigated the impact of labour market ability, as measured 
by the wage, has on the propensity to divorce. This is critically dependent on two 
factors; first, the ex post sharing rule si of joint labour income in the event of a divorce 
and second on the labour supply variation across marital status. Through Propositions 3 
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and 5 we know more about the latter of these factors and are now better equipped to 
investigate the relationship between labour market productivity and marital breakup. 
  We make the simplifying assumptions that a larger share in the ex post split in 
income and a larger increase in ex post labour supply increases the marginal net value of 
an increase in the wage: 
∂  )ll(w)lwlw(su imidiimiimii  
𝜕𝑤𝑖
|
𝑠𝑖>?̂?𝑖
>
𝜕  )ll(w)lwlw(su imidiimiimii  
𝜕𝑤𝑖
|
𝑠𝑖=?̂?𝑖
  (12a)
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Whilst the first of these inequalities perhaps is obvious the second also makes 
intuitive sense. The higher the employment in the divorced state relatively to the 
married state, the higher is the effect of an increase in the wage on the divorcee’s utility. 
Proposition 6.  
Part 1: An increase in one’s own labour market ability will; 
a) have no effect on
i
i
w
 *
in the case of si= ½ when the individuals labour supply is 
invariant to marital status (i.e. im
i
d ll  ), but will increase (decrease) i
i
w
 *
when 
i
m
i
d ll  (
i
m
i
d ll  ). 
b) decrease 
i
i
w
 *
 in the case of si<½ when im
i
d ll  . 
c) increase 
i
i
w
 *
in the case of si>½ when im
i
d ll  . 
Part 2: An increase in the spouse’s labour market ability will; 
a) have no effect on 
i
i
w
 *
 in the case of si= ½ when the individual’s labour supply is 
invariant to marital status (i.e. im
i
d ll  ),but will decrease (increase) i
i
w
 *
when 
i
m
i
d ll  (
i
m
i
d ll  ). 
b) decrease 
i
i
w
 *
when si<½ and im
i
d ll  , ambiguous otherwise. 
c) increase 
i
i
w
 *
when si>½  and im
i
d ll  , ambiguous otherwise. 
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The proof is in the Appendix. 
Proposition 6 makes it immediately apparent that there are few conclusions to 
be made with regards to the impact of labour market ability/wage on the married 
couples’ overall divorce probability, with an inequitable sharing rule after a divorce. We 
will therefore concentrate on the equitable sharing rule, where a rich picture emerges, 
and present our summarised  findings in Table 1.  
Though we distinguish between the Coasean and non-Coasean divorces in Table 
1, it illustrates the effect of labour market ability on the overall propensity to divorce are 
observably equivalent between Coasean and non-Coasean behaviour. Consider a 
situation where one individual’s propensity to divorce increases in response to higher 
labour market ability, 
i
i
w
 *
>0, whereas her/his spouse’s propensity to seek a divorce 
decreases
i
i
w
 
*
<0. We then have an indeterminate effect on the overall divorce 
probability in both the non-Coasean and Coasean instance.  Similarly, if individual 
propensities to divorce of both spouses fall (increase) in response to labour market  
ability increases then the overall divorce probability will fall (increase) both with and 
without Coasean transfers. 
Table 1 The effect of labour market ability increases under equitable sharing. 
Case Sign of 
i
m
i
d ll   
Sign of 
𝑙𝑑
−𝑖 − 𝑙𝑚
−𝑖 
Sign 
of 
𝜕𝜑𝑖
𝜕𝑤𝑖
 
Sign 
of 
𝜕𝜑−𝑖
𝜕𝑤𝑖
 
Non-
Coasean 
Divorce 
Propensity 
Coasean 
Divorce 
Propensity 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 + 0 - - - 
3 0 - 0 + NA + 
4 + 0 + 0 + + 
5 + + + - ? ? 
6 + - + + NA + 
7 - 0 - 0 NA - 
8 - + - - NA - 
9 - - - + NA ? 
In cases 1, 2, 4, and 5 both Coasean and non-Coasean bargains are possible.13  
However, following Proposition 5 non-Coasean interactions are not applicable in the 
cases where an individual works more in marriage than after divorce. Thus cases 7-9 
can only occur in Coasean bargains, since the individual, whose labour market ability is 
increasing, ends up working less in divorce than in marriage. Non Coasean behaviour 
                                                 
13 We assume here for Case 1 only that the individuals are in fixed hour contract employment where they 
cannot alter working hours following. It should however be noted from Proposition 5 that Case 1 is not 
applicable in the non-Coasean case if individuals can freely change working hours since the individuals 
would both want to reduce labour supply after a divorce. 
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can also not occur in cases 3, 6, and 9 where the spouse of the individual reduces her/his 
labour supply in response to a divorce. 
Traditional gender role models saw the male as the main family breadwinner 
with a wife working less than her husband. Though this division of labour within a 
family has weakened over time, it still persists. Whether this is because of the 
perseverance of stereotypical gender roles, merely a reflection of family optimisation or 
a combination of both is not clear. Booth and van Ours (2008) suggest that married 
couple satisfaction with hours of work and job satisfaction is highest when the male 
works full-time and the female works part-time. If we then take as a premise that many 
workers are constrained by working time, see Bell et al. (2012) for a discussion, it may 
very well be that there are a number of marriages where a full time working husband 
would find it difficult to change his working time after a divorce, whereas a part time 
working female may find it easier to increase her working hours. This is the situation 
described under cases 2 and 4 in Table 1. These cases illustrates that a marriage 
consisting of a full time working and a part time working spouse may be more likely to 
survive if the wage of the full time worker increases and the part time working spouse’s 
wage decreases. It is therefore possible that such circumstances give support to the 
adage that full time males resent their wives making investments that increase their 
wage in the labour market. These conditions are consistent and may help explain why 
young males’ preferences for stereotypical work division persist whilst females give 
more emphasis to non-monetary aspects, see Fortin (2008), and why part time work by 
females is associated with a downgrading of skills, as found in Connolly and Gregory 
(2008).  Cases 2 and 4 are further consistent with assortative matching as for instance 
argued by Burdett and Coles (1998). It also aligns well to the Becker argument where 
comparative advantage tends to suggest specialisation of tasks with one partner 
working more in the labour market and the other producing more home goods to the 
benefit of successful marriages. It finally gives theoretical support to Hoffman and 
Duncan (1995) who provide evidence of a negative correlation between the probability 
of divorce and a wife’s wage. 
 Nevertheless one must not overstate the assortative matching effect. For other 
models the division of labour may also work well for a marriage. For instance, it is 
interesting to note cases 2 and 4 also imply that increasing both spouses’ wages have an 
ambiguous effect on the overall divorce probability. Therefore it can be argued that we 
need empirically investigation to shed more light on the issue such as Whittington and 
Alm (1997) who find that both own and spouse’s after tax income increases reduce the 
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dissolution of marriages. Hence such evidence may suggest there are more routes to 
marital bliss than assortative matching. 
There are also other cases in Table 1 to evaluate. Consider the instance where 
both spouses work full time and cannot alter hours worked.  This is arguably applicable 
to case 1, where under equitable division rules any change in labour market 
remuneration will have no effect on divorce. Such a case may have become increasingly 
more applicable with time with both an increase in equitable post-divorce sharing and 
an increase in female labour participation (full-time work) over time.  
The remaining cases are all inconsistent with non-Coasean behaviour. Though 
we will not discuss all these cases extensively a couple are worth a brief mention. Cases 
3 and 7 are cases where only one individual cuts their labour supply after a divorce.  
This might encompass situations where one spouse who works hard within a marriage 
to make it work, finds it optimal to reduce her/his labour supply in the event of a 
divorce. In Case 3, the spouse cuts labour supply after a divorce. The own propensity to 
seek a divorce remains unchanged to an increase in own labour market ability but the 
spouse’s individual divorce propensity increases thus increasing the overall divorce 
probability. In Case 7 it is own labour supply that falls after the failure of the marriage, 
leading thus to a fall in the probability of divorce as own ability increases.  Whilst cases 
6 and 8 have changes in both individuals in the initial couple after a divorce, they are 
similar in intuition to cases 3 and 7 respectively.  Finally cases 5 and 9 relate to 
marriages where both individuals either increase or reduce labour supply after a 
divorce. Any change in labour market ability for such individuals will have an 
indeterminate effect on overall divorce propensities. 
 
 
6. Conclusion. 
Though the Coasean and the non-Coasean cases are similar in many ways, there 
is more to divide them than the mere effect that follows the introduction of unilateral 
divorce laws. This paper has sought to shed further light on what identifies one case 
from another. Perhaps one of the most dramatic results of the paper is the reaction of an 
individual to the increase in her/his spouse’s wage. In the non-Coasean case this will 
lead to a substitution away from own labour supply, whilst in the Coasean case there is 
instead a positive response in both own labour supply and marital production. Starting 
from the premise that Coasean bargains facilitate marital survival it is now apparent 
that there are more ways to avoid marital breakdown than the theory of comparative 
advantage would seem to suggest. For whereas that theory proposes specialisation in 
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tasks should enhance a marriage, thus making breakup less likely, our model shows that 
Coasean bargains lead to more effort in both the labour market as well as in marital 
production. This co-movement is only possible by relaxing the all-pervasive assumption 
that time is simply divided into work and leisure to instead introduce a new tripartite 
treatment of time, missing from previous literature, where time is divided into the 
activities of labour production, marital production and leisure. 
Whereas by construction, there is an absence of reactions to adverse shocks in 
the non-Coasean case, no such failures materialise in the Coasean case, where the 
analysis produces several a priori unknown but ex post intuitive results. One of the 
more notable of these is the effect that shows it is the partner who experiences less 
adverse shock who works harder in order to save the marriage. It is likewise worth 
noting that individuals with higher shares in income after a divorce can extract more 
from their spouses by getting them to contribute more within the marriage. Higher own 
wages tend to induce higher effort levels from the spouse, more concerned about 
marital break-up, though this result is dependent on the judicial sharing rule following a 
divorce.  
The results presented here further demonstrate how legal structures within 
family law play an important role for outcomes relating to labour market decisions.  The 
consideration of how property rights, to marital income during a marriage and after a 
divorce, affect the marriage outcome and divorce decision has been a neglected area of 
research. This paper seeks in part to rectify this. Though all our results are not 
contingent on equal treatment with regards to income sharing within marriage and 
divorce, many are conditional on this assumption. It is in this respect worth 
reemphasising that this condition does not need to mean that the share of income 
attributed to any individual in marriage and divorce is always necessarily 50%, but 
rather that the share an individual receives is insensitive to marital status. We have 
argued that the wider interpretation covers a range of legal jurisdictions.  Furthermore 
the more narrow 50-50 split assumption is less restrictive than what previously might 
have been the case, as we have seen a trend in legal practices and social convention that 
produce a greater emphasis on the equal treatment of individuals across gender divides. 
Assuming the trend continues the results of this paper are set to become ever more 
relevant, thereby inviting and facilitating future empirical tests. 
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APPENDIX. 
Proof of Proposition 1. 
The proof in the non-Coasean case follows directly from expression (3): 
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It follows that expressions (A1a) and (A1b) together confirm the proposition in the non-Coaseran 
case. Given that the both own and spouses marriage productivities reduce the critical shock an 
individual can bear in the non-Coasean case it is trivial to show by the use of expression (3) and 
(4) that this results also carries through to the Coasean case.    QED.                         
 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
By the total differentiation of the expressions (5a) and (5b) we have: 
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Proof of Proposition 3: 
Note the following cross derivatives: 
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For the marriage to survive the surplus at the end of the bargain must be positive for both 
parties. Thus (𝑉𝑚
𝑖 −𝑉𝑑
𝑖)>0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝑉𝑚
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−𝑖) > 0. Note also from (C1a) that 
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straightforward to show that the same inferences hold for individual –i. The proposition follows.
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Proof of Proposition 4 
Note that: 
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For part i)  of the proposition we have the following:
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Proof of Proposition 5 
Proof follows by contradiction. The optimal choice of employment after divorce is given by: 
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The labour supply condition in the  non-Coasean case can be derived from first order condition 
(5a): 
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Assume contrary to Proposition 5; 
That if si ½  then i
m
i
d ll           (E3) 
The statement in (E3) leaves the left hand side of expression (E1) strictly greater than the left 
hand side of expression (E2), by necessity yielding )l('c im
i
l )l('c
i
d
i
l
, thus implying iml <
i
dl , 
which contradicts (E3). Hence Proposition 5 is instead confirmed.   QED 
 
Proof of Proposition 6  
Expression (3) implies: 
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 With si= ½ and im
i
d ll   it follows that both above expressions are equal to zero. With s
i=½ and 
i
m
i
d ll  it follows automatically that (F1b) is negative.  Expression (F1a) is more complicated, but 
be written as:  
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 (F2) is positive given assumptions (12b). The opposite follows when im
i
d ll  .Thus Parts 1a) and 
Part 2a) are proved.  
 
Similarly, in the case of si< ½ and im
i
d ll  it follows, from assumptions (12a) and (12b), that 
expression (F1a) is negative. Expression (F1b) is likewise negative when si< ½ and im
i
d ll  .  
Parts 1b) and 2b) are thus proved.  
 
In the case of si> ½ and im
i
d ll  it follows from assumptions (12a) and (12b) expression (F1a) is 
positive. Expression (F1b) is likewise positive when si>½ and im
i
d ll  . Parts 1c) and 2c) are thus 
proved.           QED 
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Figure 1.  The non-Coasean divorce propensity. 
     𝜑𝐻 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
                                     
𝜑−𝑖                
Divorce
VV id
i
m   
    𝜑∗
−𝑖 
     
Divorce
VV id
i
m
     
     𝜑𝐿 
             𝜑𝐿                                  𝜑∗
𝑖                                                                                  𝜑𝐻 
                                                                  𝜑𝑖  
    
Figure 2. The Coasean bargains divorce propensity 
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